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1993-94 FOURTH CIRCUIT SUMMARY
The Fourth Circuit Summary is a new addition to the
William and Mary Journal of Environmental Law, replacing
the Virginia Legislative Summary. The Fourth Circuit
Summary provides a summary of prevailing environmental
decisions decided by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit during the previous year. It does not
cover every environmental decision of the Fourth Circuit
during the previous year, but only those cases which the
editors believe to be of the most interest to our subscribers.
CERCLA
1. White v. County of Newberry, South Carolina, 985 F.2d 168
(4th Cir. 1993)
Plaintiffs owned and operated a restaurant adjacent to Newberry
County Public Works Maintenance Facility ("maintenance facility"). The
County used the facility to service and maintain County owned vehicles.
In March 1989, the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control ("DHEC") found unsafe levels of trichloroethylene
("TCE") in wells located on both properties. As a result of the
contamination, plaintiffs discontinued use of their well and connected their
property to the public water supply at the cost of $6,000. Both the DHEC
and plaintiffs investigated the County's maintenance facility as a possible
source of TCE. The DHEC concluded that the TCE contamination was
not due to any County activity. While plaintiffs admitted to locating no
evidence proving that the County used TCE, they suggested that the TCE
could have resulted from the facility's use of a Safety Kleen apparatus and
degreasing components.
Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the County
seeking damages for the County's alleged contamination of their ground
water well. Plaintiffs' suit alleged that the County violated CERCLA and
alleged state claims of inverse condemnation, negligence, strict liability
and trespass. The jury awarded the Whites $172,000 under the inverse
condemnation claim. The district court, however, dismissed the
negligence, trespass, and strict liability claims and entered a judgment in
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the County's favor on the CERCLA claim. The district court further
dismissed the County's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the
inverse condemnation claim.
On appeal, the County challenged the district court's jurisdiction
over plaintiffs' state law claims and the court's denial of its motion for
judgment as a matter of law on the inverse condemnation claim. Plaintiffs
also cross appealed the dismissal of their CERCLA claim.
The Fourth Circuit denied the County's challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction. The County argued that although the district court had
jurisdiction over the CERCLA claim, it lacked jurisdiction over the state
claim of inverse condemnation because the CERCLA claim and the inverse
condemnation claim did not arise out of the same case or controversy.
The court rejected this argument and held that the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation claim because both
claims shared the common element of showing that the County dumped or
disposed of TCE in a manner that caused contamination.
The Fourth Circuit then reversed the district court's denial of the
County's motion for judgment as a matter of law. In order to prevail on
their claim of inverse condemnation, plaintiffs had to show that the County
acted in an "affirmative, positive and aggressive" manner to contaminate
their well with TCE. In de novo review of the issue, the court held, that
the White's evidence failed to conclusively prove that the County even
handled TCE. In fact, the court found that the County offered inferential
evidence that the TCE could have come from plaintiffs' property. Because
plaintiffs could not conclusively connect the County with the
contamination of their well, the Fourth Circuit concluded that they failed
to establish the first element in their claim for inverse condemnation and
that judgment as a matter of law should have been granted.
Lastly, based on plaintiffs' failure to establish an affirmative act in
their inverse condemnation claim, the court concluded that plaintiffs did
not establish a release of a hazardous substance in their CERCLA claim.
Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of
the County on the CERCLA claim.
2. United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993)
In the 1970s, defendant Skipper owned "Potter's Pits," 217 acres
of land in North Carolina, and allegedly deposited hazardous waste
materials on it. In 1976, the United States Coast Guard cleaned up an oil
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spill on the property, and the remaining sludge was allegedly buried at the
site. In 1979, Wachovia Bank and Trust Company ("Wachovia") obtained
a security interest in the property as collateral for a loan made to Skipper.
When Skipper defaulted in 1980, Wachovia exercised its rights and
foreclosed. Wachovia bought the property as the sole bidder at the
foreclosure sale and immediately sold it to the first available buyers, the
McLambs and the Cains, defendants. The McLambs and the Cains
immediately began a residential development on the property. The Cains
conveyed their interest in the property to the Andersons, defendants, and
the McLambs and the Andersons then conveyed their interests to the
newly-formed Investors Management Corporation ("IMC"), defendant.
Three years later, IMC learned of the oil spill and the incomplete
hazardous waste clean-up. EPA commenced another clean-up operation
shortly thereafter.
Pursuant to section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), the United States
filed suit against the current and former landowners of Potter's Pits for
recovery of costs incurred in the 1983 clean-up operation. The defendants
in turn filed a third-party complaint against Wachovia for contribution
under section 113(f(1) of CERCLA. The district court granted summary
judgment for Wachovia on the ground that the bank fell within CERCLA's
security interest exemption, section 101(20)(A). The McLambs and IMC,
appealed
On appeal, appellants argued that the security interest exemption
provision did not apply. The provision excludes from contribution actions
any person who held "'indicia of ownership [in the property] primarily to
protect his security interest"' and who did not participate in the
management of the property. The appellants contended that the provision
did not apply to Wachovia because Wachovia obtained full title at the
foreclosure sale and thus acquired more than mere "indicia of ownership."
In addition, appellants maintained that the exemption did not apply because
Wachovia acted in a "commercially unreasonable" manner in failing to
inform the buyers about the oil spill and previous clean-up operation.
The Fourth Circuit held that the security interest exemption did
apply. Wachovia met both of the provision's requirements: (1) Wachovia
met the "indicia of ownership" requirement because it obtained title at the
foreclosure sale solely to protect its security interest and acted with
reasonable diligence in reselling the property, and (2) it did not manage or
use the property in its brief period of outright ownership. The court
rejected appellants' argument that Wachovia lost its exempt status by
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failing to act in a commercially reasonable manner because such a
requirement does not appear in the language of the security interest
exemption provision.
ENDANGERED SPECIES
3. United States v. Mitchell, 985 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir. 1993)
Defendant, a zoologist working for the United States Department
of the Interior, was charged with obstructing the "due administration of the
tax laws" in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) because he used his position
at the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior to lobby
for the delisting of endangered species and to obtain hunting privileges in
China and Pakistan for big-game hunters who made charitable
contributions to AEU, a tax-exempt organization the defendant had
founded for the purpose of "promoting and facilitating scientific research
in the area of ecology." In addition, defendant caused the big-game
hunters to file income tax returns that fraudulently claimed that these
contributions were tax-exempt donations.
Defendant admitted that these activities may have been criminal but
denied that they violated 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) as an "artifice and scheme
to defraud the United States" and a "corrupt endeavor to impede and
obstruct the due administration of the tax laws" as the government
contended. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's narrow reading
of the statute and found that the statute reached defendant's fraudulent
representation of AEU as a tax-exempt organization to the Internal
Revenue Service and his inducement of big-game hunters to file false tax
returns.
Defendant was also charged with violating the Lacey Act, which
prohibits the taking and transporting of animals in violation of foreign
laws, because of his violation of the Pakistani Imports and Exports
(Control) Act of 1950 and the Punjab Wildlife Act of 1974. The Fourth
Circuit reviewed the evidence regarding Pakistani laws de novo and held:
(1) the district court's ruling that the personal baggage exception to the
Imports and Exports Act allowed defendant's unlicensed export of hides
and horns of a Punjab urial and a Chinkara gazelle was in error because
to apply the exception to wildlife trophies would defeat the wildlife
conservation purpose of the statute's ban, and (2) the district court's
ruling that section 14(2) of Punjab Wildlife Act, which prohibited the
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export of any protected animal trophy out of Punjab without a permit, was
unconstitutional under the Pakistani constitution's commerce clause was
unnecessary because defendant had already violated one foreign law and,
therefore, had violated the Lacey Act.
In addition, because only the portion of the Punjab Wildlife Act
governing export of animal trophies from Punjab was determined to be
unconstitutional, defendant was still guilty of violating sections 12(1) and
13 of the Punjab Wildlife Act, which prohibits the possession of any wild
animal without a certificate of lawful possession and makes it illegal to
receive any animal trophy unless it is accompanied by a certificate of
lawful possession.
4. United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1993)
Defendant advertised a Siberian tiger skin rug and Bengal tiger skin
for sale in a national newspaper. A prospective buyer contacted the United
States Fish and Wildlife Service prior to the sale, and an undercover agent
accompanied the buyer to the sale and audiotaped the transaction.
Defendant was subsequently arrested and convicted of violating provision
1538(a)(1)(F) of the Endangered Species Act. The district court found that
the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant offered a
Siberian tiger skin rug and a Bengal tiger skin for sale in interstate or
foreign commerce.
On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction under section 1538(a)(1)(F). Section
1538(a)(1)(F) states that it is unlawful to sell or offer for sale, in interstate
or foreign commerce, any endangered species listed pursuant to section
1533. The tiger has been listed as an endangered species pursuant to this
section since 1972. Although the skins were pre-Act skins, the Fourth
Circuit found that none of the statutory exceptions applied to defendant
because his dealings were commercial. Furthermore, defendant's actions
satisfied the interstate commerce requirement because he knew that the
purchaser was a Georgia resident and made statements about a potential
foreign buyer. The court also rejected defendant's argument that the
audiotape should not have been admitted as evidence, explaining that the
district court did not "abuse its discretion" when it admitted the tape
because the government laid a sufficient foundation for its admission and
the transcript of the tape was sufficiently accurate.
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Defendant also challenged his conviction on the theory of estoppel
by entrapment. The entrapment defense protects a defendant charged with
committing illegal activities from prosecution when the defendant
reasonably relies upon the advice of a government official that the
committed activities are legal. In this situation, government officials did
not tell defendant that interstate sales of pre-Act wildlife, defined to
include skins, were legal. Defendant reached this conclusion after
speaking with, or hearing statements from, a museum official, a taxidermist
and a former Assistant Secretary of Interior for Fish, Wildlife and Parks.
The evidence showed that the museum official provided the name of a
taxidermist, with no mention of the legality of interstate sales; the
taxidermist was not a government official and thus did not satisfy the
requirements of the defense; and the former Assistant Secretary never
made statements as to the legality of pre-Act skin sales. Therefore, the
court held that this defense was not available.
Finally, the court held that defendant was properly fined according
to sentencing guidelines. The value of the skins was based upon
defendant's own statements as to their worth. The sentencing guidelines
authorize an increase in offense level when the combined market value of
the wildlife exceeds $20,000. The skins were valued at $21,000, thus,
defendant's offense level was properly increased.
CLEAN WATER ACT
5. James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993)
In 1988, the Corps of Engineers ("Corps") granted James City
County ("County") a permit under section 404(b) of the Clean Water Act
for the building of a dam and reservoir across Ware Creek for its local
water supply. The EPA vetoed this permit under the authority of section
404(c). At trial, the district court granted the County summary judgment
and ordered the Corps to issue a permit. On the first appeal, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on
its finding that the EPA did not present substantial evidence to support its
determination that the County had practicable alternatives to building the
reservoir, but the court remanded to the EPA to allow it to determine
whether environmental considerations alone would justify a veto. On
remand, the EPA again vetoed the permit based solely on environmental
considerations. At a second trial, the district court again granted summary
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judgment to the County and ordered the Corps to issue a permit. The EPA
appealed.
The two issues on appeal were whether the EPA can veto a permit
based on environmental harm alone and whether the classification by the
EPA of "unacceptable adverse effects" is correct and supported by the
facts.
The Fourth Circuit first reviewed section 404(b) and (c) of the
Clean Water Act and found that the EPA is authorized to deny a permit
based on a finding of adverse environmental effects. Second, the court
examined the guidelines for making permit determinations under section
404 for permits issued jointly by the Corps and EPA, and concluded that
the guidelines (1) give the EPA discretion over whether to consider non-
environmental costs and (2) allow a section 404(c) veto even if no
alternatives to the project exist. Third, the court found that the two tiered
permit granting system between the Corps and the EPA gives the EPA
final say in the permit determination, noting that Congress recognized the
expertise of the EPA and thus gave them the authority to veto when there
are "unacceptable adverse effects." The court, thus, held that the EPA
does have the authority to veto a permit based on adverse effects without
consideration of the great need for water by the County.
The Fourth Circuit then reviewed the EPA's analysis in its final
determination upon remand under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.
The court found that the distict court failed to give the EPA's
determination due deference and erred in using the "substantial evidence"
standard. Under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, the agency must
have reviewed the relevant data, explained satisfactorily its decision, and
have a rational connection between the data and the decision. The court
then examines the analysis to see if there was a clear error in judgment.
In its determination, the EPA considered the impact of the dam and
reservoir on the wildlife, the fisheries, and recreation in the area and
general vicinity. The EPA found that the impact would result in a loss of
381 acres of wetlands and 792 acres of forested uplands habitat. In
addition, the EPA found adverse effects on the animal population and the
Chesapeake Bay. The EPA also analyzed the mitigation plan offered by
the County and found that the plan would not adequately replace the types
and qualities of wetlands that the dam would destroy. The court held that
this analysis and determination by the EPA was supported by the record
and not arbitrary or capricious, and, therefore, reversed the district court's
judgment.
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6. United States v. Strandquist, 993 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1993)
Defendant worked as a full-time manager for the Halle Marina and
Campground ("Marina"), whose facilities include a campground, boat basin
with boat slips, and a bathing beach. His duties as manager included
overseeing the removal and disposal of raw sewage generated by the
Marina. Defendant testified that on several occasions Marina employees
under his orders dumped sewage from recreational vehicles ("RVs") and
campers into a storm grate rather than pump the sewage into one of the
three septic systems on Marina property as required by Marina policy.
Evidence revealed at trial proved that the storm grate was connected to an
underground pipe that ran beneath the road and discharged into the boat
basin.
In a jury trial, defendant was convicted for illegally discharging
pollutants into navigable waters of the United States in violation of the
Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Specifically, he was found guilty of two
counts; he violated CWA sections 301(a) and 309(c)(2) for two separate
discharges into the storm grate. The district court computed his sentence
by applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG") effective
November 1, 1991 for environmental offenses, in particular USSG section
2Q1.3 for the mishandling of environmental pollutants. Defendant, a first
time offender, was sentenced to five months imprisonment on each count
to be served concurrently, supervised release for one year, and home
detention for five months during the supervised release.
On appeal, defendant challenged both his conviction and sentence.
First, he contended the government failed to present sufficient evidence
proving that any discharge for which he was charged reached the navigable
waters of the boat basin as required for a conviction under the CWA
sections 301(a) and 502(12). In challenging his sentence, defendant argued
(1) that the Sentencing Commission exceeded the mandate of the enabling
act when it created USSG section 2Q1.3, (2) that even if the Sentencing
Guidelines for environmental offenses as applied in the instant case are
valid, the district court improperly calculated his sentence when the court
applied USSG section 2Q1.3(b)(1), the enhancement provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines for environmental offenses, and (3) that he was
entitled to a downward departure in offense level for accepting
responsibility.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the defendant's conviction to
determine whether there was insufficient evidence to convict him, asking
whether a rational jury member could have concluded that the government
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had proven the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It
reviewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. The
evidence presented at trial consisted of (1) the observations of private
citizens, FBI agents, and an EPA official of sewage on the storm grate and
a similar fluid being discharged from the pipe into the basin, (2) FBI
agents observing an employee dumping sewage into the storm grate, (3)
tests that revealed that the fluid on the storm grate, in the pipe, and in the
basin were all sewage, and (4) a dye test which showed that the storm
grate connected to the basin. The court held the reasonable inferences
from the evidence supported the jury's conclusion that the sewage
discharged by the defendant did in fact reach the navigable waters of the
United States and that circumstantial evidence may support a guilty
verdict, "even though it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis
consistent with innocence."
The court then addressed defendant's argument that section 2Q1.3
of the Sentencing Guidelines exceeded the mandate of its enabling
legislation and was contrary to congressional intent because the Guidelines
failed to differentiate among environmental crimes of varying seriousness.
The court rejected defendant's argument, relying on United States v. Ellen,
961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 217 (1992), in which the
court rejected a similar argument and upheld the sentence of a defendant,
although the defendant in Ellen had caused greater environmental damage
than the defendant in the case at issue. The court adopted the reasoning
from the Ellen opinion, which found that the Sentencing Commission acted
within its discretion when classifying the instant offense as a "serious one"
because harm to the environment is a "public policy concern of the
greatest magnitude." Congress stressed the importance of its
environmental goals by creating severe penalties for violations of the
CWA. Therefore, although the environmental damage in the instant case
was not as extensive, the court found that the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters is a serious public concern and held that the sentence of
a prison term for a first time offender reflects the seriousness of the
offense and does not contravene the Guideline's enabling legislation.
The court then reviewed defendant's argument that his sentence was
improperly calculated under section 2Q1.3(b)(1) because in order to trigger
that section, which increases the base level offense by six, the prosecution
must prove actual contamination and that the offense was an "ongoing,
continuous, or repetitive discharge." The court held the manner of proof
for contamination need not be decided here because the district court's
finding of contamination was not clearly erroneous. Section 2Q1.3(b)(1)
4091994]
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only requires contamination and not permanent or vast contamination to
be applicable. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that where discharges
occur on more than one occasion the discharge is "ongoing, continuous, or
repetitive," making section 2Q1.3(b)(1)(A) applicable.
Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that the district
court erred in not allowing a downward departure for acceptance of
responsibility. Applying the clearly erroneous standard, the court held that
the district court's finding that the defendant did not fully accept
responsibility was not clearly erroneous because the defendant challenged
the finding that the sewage flowed into the boat basin and denied
knowledge that the sewage would flow into the boat basin.
7. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, No. 92-2520, 1993
WL 590484 (4th Cir. 1993)
Two environmental groups, the Natural Resources Defense Council
("NRDC") and the Environmental Defense Fund, filed separate suits
against EPA. These suits dealt with provisions of the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and EPA's interpretation of these provisions. The suits
specifically challenged both EPA's 1984 dioxin criteria document and its
approval of the water quality standards adopted by Maryland and Virginia
in 1990. After the suits were consolidated, the district court dismissed
both complaints and a subsequent amended complaint.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed what standard of scrutiny
was proper for EPA and the courts when reviewing state standards. The
court rejected NRDC's assertion that EPA had a duty to take a more active
role in the review process by independently ensuring that state standards
meet the CWA requirements. Although both the states and EPA share the
responsibilities of achieving the goals of the CWA, the states are primarily
responsible for establishing the appropriate water quality standards under
this statute. EPA provides guidance in setting these standards through
developing criteria documents, and the standards set by the states are
subject to review by EPA. The court held that EPA's duty under the
CWA was to determine whether a state's decision was scientifically
defensible and protective of the water's designated use. Noting that most
courts are not qualified to conduct their own scientific research, the court
held that the role of the court should only be to decide whether the proper
legal standards were applied.
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The court then decided whether the district court erred in
confirming EPA's approval of the state dioxin standards. Agreeing with
the district court, the court held that the proper standard of review for
EPA's actions was whether they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." This is a highly
deferential standard which presumes the validity of the agency's action.
If a rational basis exists for EPA's decision, then it is valid. Based on the
lengthy scientific and technical documents supporting approval, the court
found that EPA's decision was neither arbitrary or capricious.
Finally, the court affirmed the district court's decision that EPA's
duty to update its water quality criteria for pollutants was discretionary.
It also upheld the district court's dismissal of the amended complaint in
which NRDC alleged that EPA's failure to update the criteria violated
section 703 of the CWA. The court held that to violate this standard
EPA's criteria document must be "final" according to the test outlined by
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239-40
(1980). The document was not "final" because EPA was in the process of
reassessing the criteria and the use of the criteria by states in determining
their standards is not mandatory.
8. Sasser v. EPA, 990 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1993)
Defendant, an owner of wetlands in South Carolina, applied to the
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for a permit to restore an embankment,
which would require discharging dredged material into the wetlands. The
Corps denied the permit. Several years later, defendant constructed an
embankment based on a wrong assumption that a nationwide permit
allowed him to undertake such activity. In 1987, the Administrator of the
EPA issued an administrative order requiring defendant to stop discharging
pollutants into a tributary of the Pee Dee River in South Carolina and to
submit a restoration plan. After repeated noncompliance, an administrative
law judge imposed fines and directed defendant to submit and implement
a restoration plan. On appeal, defendant sought to set aside the
Administrator's order on the grounds that the Administrator lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, that the proceedings violated his Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial, and that the Administrator failed to consider his good
faith in relying on the nationwide permit.
The Fourth Circuit denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Prior to 1987, EPA could only impose a
1994]
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civil penalty for discharging pollutants into wetlands through the district
courts. In 1987, however, Congress authorized the Administrator to assess
civil penalties. Although the administrative complaint charges that
defendant discharged pollutants into the wetlands without a permit in 1986,
the court found that the Administrator's order is not a retroactive
application of the amendment because defendant's violation was a
continuing one that lasted well after the amendment was enacted.
The court then addressed whether the administrative proceedings
violated defendant's Seventh Amendments rights. The Seventh
Amendment does not apply to disputes over statutory public rights, which
are disputes between the government and persons subject to government
authority that involve the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative branches. The court found that the dispute
between defendant and the Administrator involved statutory public rights
because the goals of the Act are the "restoration and maintenance of the
integrity of the nation's waters." Thus, the Seventh Amendment did not
give defendant a right to a jury trial in the administrative hearing.
Defendant's final argument was that the Administrator erred in
imposing the maximum penalty allowed by the Act because he relied in
good faith on an attorney's advice that he could proceed under the
nationwide permit. However, the court found that defendant did not fully
inform the attorney or have him inspect the land before giving his opinion
and did not confirm the attorney's advice with the Corps before
proceeding; therefore, he was not entitled to rely on that opinion.
Furthermore, although specific approval to discharge dredged material
under a nationwide permit is not required, a private party bears the risk of
liability if the discharge is later found to be impermissible. Lastly,
defendant refused to comply with the Corps' orders to stop construction.
Based on these findings and the fact that the work was impermissible
under the nationwide permit, the court held that the Administrator did not
abuse his discretion in finding that defendant did not proceed in good faith.
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIMS ACT
9. Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 1993)
A property owner brought suit against the United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for diminution of value of property that
was the former site of a trinitrotoluene ("TNT") production facility. The
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Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for
the United States based on a finding that plaintiff's administrative
complaint was barred by the running of the statute of limitations. The
FTCA requires that plaintiffs present an administrative claim to an agency
within two years of the date a cause of action accrues.
Under the FTCA, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff
knows, or through due diligence, should have known of the existence and
the cause of the injury. Plaintiff argued that there was no injury until the
Army refused to purchase the property, and maintained that the injury
occurred when the plaintiff had knowledge that the property was
"undesirable and unsafe for anything." The court rejected plaintiffs
claims, holding that the plaintiff knew of both an injury to his property and
the cause of the injury over two years before the claim was filed. The
court found that the plaintiff's property was not contaminated by by-
products of the TNT manufacturing process, but that adjacent property was
rendered "hazardous and dangerous" by contamination and that the
plaintiff's correspondence with the Army indicated that he knew the
adjacent property was contaminated and that it had an adverse impact on
the value of his property.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected plaintiff's alternative argument that
the statute of limitations period should have been equitably tolled.
Equitable tolling was found not to be an appropriate remedy because the
plaintiff had failed to diligently protect his legal rights. The court held
that plaintiffs knowledge of the former use of his property and the
contamination of adjacent property created an obligation to take steps to
investigate the possibility of claims against the United States, which he
failed to do.
ATToRNEY's FEES
10. Roanoke River Basin Ass'n v. Hudson, 991 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.
1993)
Prior to 1984, the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") issued a
permit allowing the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, to construct an 85-
mile pipeline in order to supply Virginia Beach with potable water from
Lake Gaston (on the Virginia-North Carolina border). In January 1984,
North Carolina and others filed suit against the Corps challenging the
issuance of the permit. In May 1984, the Roanoke River Basin
1994] 413
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Association ("RRBA") intervened and sought to declare the permit null and
void, listing various deficiencies in the Corps' consideration of the permit.
All parties moved for summary judgment. The district court rejected all
but two of RRBA's challenges and remanded these two issues, concerning
the impact on the striped bass and the water needs of Virginia Beach, to
the Corps for further investigation. After further study, the Corps
concluded that Virginia Beach had sufficient need for the water and that
the project would have minimal effect on the striped bass. Nevertheless,
the Corps agreed to take measures to mitigate the impact of the pipeline
on the striped bass. On review, the district court upheld the issuance of
the permit, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Corps had
properly considered all environmental and non-environmental factors in its
decision.
RRBA then filed a petition under the Equal Access to Justice Act
("EAJA") for attorneys' fees and expenses for the two remanded issues.
Section 2412(d)(1)(A) of EAJA provides that courts shall award attorneys'
fees and expenses to the "prevailing party" in actions "brought by or
against the United States ... unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified." EAJA was intended to allow
private parties, who have substantially less resources than the United
States, equal access to the courts and to insure that only reasonable
governmental positions on policy and rules will be enforced. The district
court concluded that RRBA was the "prevailing party" on the striped bass
issue but that the government's position in the litigation as a whole was
"substantially justified." The district court thus refused to award attorneys'
fees and expenses to RRBA. RRBA appealed.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of how to
determine whether the government's position was "substantially justified":
Should it look at the entire litigation or focus only on the issue on which
the fee petitioning party prevailed? The court considered the policy
rationale behind the two requirements and concluded that they were
distinct. The first prong, determining which party "prevailed," concerned
only the degree of success of the fee petitioner. The second prong,
whether the government advanced a "substantially justified" position,
concerned the government's overall "'position in the litigation,"' not the
success of the government's arguments. The second prong requires that
the government's overall position be a reasonable one. Thus, in
determining whether the two requirements are met, the court held that,
under EAJA, courts should focus on specific issues when determining
which party "prevailed" and should consider the litigation as a whole when
414
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deciding whether the government's position is "substantially justified." In
addition, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in holding that the Corps' position was "substantially justified."
RCRA
11. Feikema v. Texaco, Inc., No. 93-1649, 1994 WL 62091 (4th Cir.
1994)
Defendant, Texaco, owns and operates a petroleum distribution
terminal. Beginning in 1988, various petroleum products leaked into the
soil and groundwater from storage tanks on the site, and an oil plume
began moving toward the adjacent residential properties owned by the
plaintiffs. In September 1990, petroleum products became visible in a
creek which flows near and along the homeowners' properties. The EPA
investigated the leak and found that the plume presented an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment within the meaning
of section 7003(a) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). The EPA negotiated a consent order, which required various
remedial measures, including excavation and removal of contaminated soil
and the monitoring of wells and storm sewers for the presence of oil.
In 1993, the homeowners filed a complaint against Texaco, alleging
state claims for nuisance and trespass. In their complaint, the homeowners
alleged that the remedial measures failed to remedy the leaking and that
they have been, and continue to be threatened with actual petroleum
pollution. The homeowners requested both injunctive relief and damages
of an unspecified amount. The district court dismissed the action on the
grounds that both RCRA and the consent order preempt the state claims.
The court of appeals held that the consent order preempts the
claims for injunctive relief; however, it remanded the case, allowing the
homeowners to pursue the damage claims for nuisance and trespass.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part,
holding that because RCRA does not regulate so pervasively as to occupy
the field completely, state claims are preempted only if they actually
conflict with RCRA or with the consent order. Section 7003, which
authorizes the EPA to act, does not, in the absence of some EPA action,
conflict with the state actions for nuisance or trespass because nothing in
that section gives the EPA exclusive authority to act.
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The court, however, denied the injunctive relief requested by the
homeowners on the basis that such a remedy would conflict with the
remedial measures required by the consent order. Because the state claims
address the same site and conditions covered by the EPA order, the court
held that those claims are preempted to the extent that they seek injunctive
relief before the order has terminated. The court reasoned that a court
adjudicating state claims could not substitute its judgment concerning the
appropriate remedial measures for the authorized judgment of the EPA or
usurp the review role given to the EPA by RCRA.
Finally, the court held that the neither the consent order nor section
7003 preempted the homeowners' damage claims for nuisance and
trespass. It reasoned that because the order does not address compensation
for damages caused by the imminent hazard, the state damage claims did
not actually conflict with the order. Furthermore, section 7003, the
provision under which the order was entered, only authorizes the EPA to
seek injunctive relief and does not address compensation for damages
caused by the imminent hazard. Thus, the state damage claims did not
actually conflict with RCRA, even if section 7003 did give the EPA
exclusive authority to act.
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